In what was said to be yet another big step towards stability and normalization, 329 MPs (275 from lower house and 54 from the upper house) of the recently consolidated Federal Republic of Somalia have voted in Mohamed Abdullahi “Farmajo” Mohamed as president of the republic this week. The election took place in a heavily fortified international airport in Mogadishu under duress of attack from the Al-Qaeda affiliated Al-Shabaab group.
The election saw two former prime ministers, Omar Abdirashid Sharmake and Abdullahi “Farmajo” Mohamed, pinned against the sitting president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and former president Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. Going into the polls, the incumbent was a clear favorite with hundreds of MPs behind him followed by Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. On top of that, the latter two coming from the biggest clans in Somalia— Hawiye—and Farmajo from the Darod clan made most election predictions to tilt their way.
The result was something that is less anticipated. Farmajo managed to secure 184 out of 329 combined votes of the two houses followed by Mohamud, who got 90 of the votes. The news of the victory of Farmajo was welcomed by cheers and celebration on the streets of Mogadishu. Farmajo, 55, is viewed by many as a “progressive technocrat” on account of his track record in fighting corruption during his one-year tenure as prime minister (2010-2011).
“He is a man of principles and he has shown that by distancing himself from the public money during his tenure in office as prime minister,” Abdulkarim Ahmed Guleid, an Ethiopian Somali and veteran parliamentarian in the House of peoples’ Representatives, says. He has got the confidence of the people, Abdulkarim says, and it is obvious that even the supporters of the incumbent have voted for him. “I dare say that Somalis have elected a truly popular leader for the first time,” he reflects on the outcome.
In all counts, the election process by itself was something of a talking point for Somalis and the international community alike. Yet again, the election mechanism is also based on the unique structure of the country’s legislature.
The structure of the Somali legislature – as agreed up by the various clan systems in the country – is based on the so called 4.5 power sharing formula among the four major clans and the fifth one, which is made up of a consortium of other clans and people in Somalia whose number is not as significant as the other four. This power sharing formula stipulates that the four major clans in Somalia are to equally have 61 seats in the 275-member lower house while the remaining 30 something seats are assigned to the various “other” clans.
Similarly, the 54-memebr upper house is set aside for the emerging regional states in Somalia and the senators who are nominated by the presidents of these regional states. At the end of the day, the Somali election encompasses the election of both the lower house (Members of Parliament) and the upper house (Senators).
The current election arrangement – although a significant improvement over previous elections – still leaves a lot to be desired. The election which saw the incumbent Mohamud ascend to power had 135 clan leaders directly elect the 275 lower house MPs which in turn voted to name the president of the republic. The case of the upper house is a bit different. It is the within the mandate of the regional state leaders (presidents) to nominate two candidates for each of the 54 positions in the upper house and for their regional councils (assemblies) to vote one of the candidates as senator.
This year’s election took the process a step further. Instead of direct participation in the election of MPs, the 135 clan leaders nominated a 50-member electoral college for each seat in the lower house, all in all constituting a 13,750 people electorate body to vote to elect MPs. Although participation has increased significantly, Somalia’s election process is still far from being a democratic election.
In fact, when Mohamud came to power, one of the promises that he made was to implement “one-vote-for-one-person” electoral system reducing the influence of the powerful clan systems in Somalia’s political life. Turns out, universal suffrage is not as easy as it was anticipated. As the date of the election drew nearer around the end of last year, Mohamud decided to extend the deadline to shift to “one-vote-for-one-person” electoral system to 2020. Although it was not ideal, most international partners and clan leaders in Somalia has agreed to accept the outcome of this week’s election since the threat from Al-Shabaab is still quite real in many parts of the country.
“One-vote-one-person cannot exist in vacuum,” Lulseged Girma, political commentator and Horn of Africa affairs analyst, says. According to him, it requires a systematic evolution of normative, institutional and collaborative frameworks. He says that that is why a three-year term has been fixed to lay a foundation for the evolution to ensure universal suffrage for the more than 11 million Somalis. Nevertheless, the election did not measure up to the sub-optimal elections conducted in Africa let alone to the international standards and norms.
Yet again, the legitimacy of the process and the elected presidents could not be questioned, according to the Lulseged. “The election is legitimate as the country is suffering from Al-Shabaab’s Islamic-Jihadi acts. The 14,000 elders’ election of legislators and senators to elect the president depicts how Somalia can do for the time being,” he argues. Due to the unpredictable acts of Al-Shabaab, it seems that the clan leaders, who have strong hands in making peace and stability in their country, and the international community, have accepted the system and the result, for the moment.
Beyond solidifying his powers, a lot of other challenges await Farmajo in the coming years. For one, he needs to overcome the challenge of consolidating the nascent federalist arrangement of Somalia. He is also yet to come up with an agreeable national constitution that binds all Somalis together. For starters, the recently emerging regional states in Somalia and the various forms of political organizations in these states is something to worry about for Farmajo.
As of 2016, Somalia is divided into 6 proposed regional states which include the self-proclaimed sovereign state of Somaliland and the semi-autonomous region of Puntland. Apart from the two, Galmudug, South West State, Hir-Shabelle and Jubaland have been recognized as legitimate regional states in Somalia forming the primary building block to the envisioned federal state.
However, there are also around three unrecognized regional entities emerging in Somalia recently: Awdalland, Zeila and Lughaya State and Khatumo State. All the three are not yet recognized by the federal government of Somalia or the neighboring autonomous regions of Somaliland and Puntland. Apart from that, Somalia is divided into eighteen administrative regions which may fall under one of the regional states or yet to be consolidated into one. For instance, the case of the administrative region of Banadir, administrative region encompassing the capital city Mogadishu, is left out of the upper house of the Federal Republic of Somalia since it is not a state and states hold the exclusive right to be represented in the senate.
Somaliland, however, do not consider themselves to be part of the federal arrangement south of its boarder. And if the strong resolve of Somalilanders is something to go by, the chance of them integrating with Somalia is quite slim. Abdulkarim believes that integrating Somaliland with others in the federal union could be an extremely tough task for any president occupying the Villa Somalia.
Lulseged as well agrees that forcing Somaliland to join the federation will be a fatal effort on the side of Somalia since it has already declared itself to be a sovereign entity. According to him, the Somalilanders move away from Somalia deterred by constant chaos and conflict. And the normalization and reconstruction of Somalia might be the only factor which could attract Somaliland, he argues.
Nevertheless, Abdulkarim argues that for Somaliland to think about reintegrating into Somalia the wounds that it has suffered in the hands of the former Somalia should start to heal first. “Somaliland suffered a great deal while in the union; they have experienced a great deal of massacre of their people in those days,” he argues. Somaliland is not a lost cause entirely for both commentators though.
Abdulkarim says that it is about the new president and how he could negotiate to convince Somaliland to join the federation. In fact, he says that, Farmajo could have quite steep task ahead of him in terms of bringing together the desperate regional entities in Somalia. While for Lulseged, the solution lays in the bottom up approach to building federalism which the government has started to implement already. “Somaliland might come back if Somalia succeeds in implementing bottom-up approach to building their federal state,” he argues.
However, the bottom-up approach to federalism is not easy to accomplish, commentators say. Already, the fragmented and fluid regional consolidation is taking its toll in the war-torn Somalia. For one, boundary demarcation is looks to be a big issue among the emerging states. Already a handful of the regional states are in conflict as a result of border demarcation and many of them hold claims of territories within the boundaries of one-another.
On the other hand, the intense power struggles to control leadership roles of these powerful regional states is another conundrum for Somalia. Clan power sharing arrangement superimposed on the regional state configuration could be quite difficult to manage for president elect, according to commentators.
Also important is the ambiguity in power division between the federal government and regional states. So far, there is little byway of agreeable definition to power and responsibilities of the federal authority and regional states, both having power over the resources and operating their own independent armies and police forces.
However, Farmajo is also expected to be tested by the various political interests of the international community and the regional powers who have a hand in the internal politics of Somalia. Abdulkarim believes that greatest challenge to Farmajo will be coming from managing these external interests and partnerships. “I don’t think I he will have significant problem from side of the internal politics; but managing the countries like the US and those in AMISOM and IGAD including the two biggest troop contributors Kenya and Ethiopia will be a true testament to his political prowess,” he explains.
Abdulkarim expects a hard time from the US and Kenya for new president. “Although he is a US citizen, Farmajo is not known to be soft for the interests of the US or foreigners,” he says and that will give him hard time. In fact, he continues to argue, he might also need to think hard about the kind of relationship he wants to have with Ethiopia. He is of view that no president in Villa Somalia can effectively rule Mogadishu let alone Somalia without having the support of countries like Ethiopia. “As Prime Minister during the time of Meles Zenawi, Farmajo is well aware of the politics and interest of Ethiopia. He was reported to have a good relationship with the former PM and I hope he continues to have that kind of relationship with current administration,” Abdulkarim concludes.
Nevertheless, some analysts say that Farmajo’s independent nature could put him at loggerheads with countries like Kenya and Ethiopia on certain issues. Until print time, no official statement was issued by the government of Ethiopian and Kenya regarding the presidential election and future of politics in Somalia.
Source:the reporter/Ethiopia